Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mental states: Mental states are internal states of mind that include thoughts, feelings, emotions, sensations, and perceptions. They are subjective experiences that cannot be directly observed by others. See also Brain states, Brain, Thoughts, Thinking, Cognition, Consciousness, Perception, Sensation, Emotions, Behavior._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Colin McGinn on Mental States - Dictionary of Arguments
II 74f Perception/McGinn: The perception of yellow depends existentially on what occurs in the neurons of the visual cortex. But it is not true that these neural processes are part of the experience. Our consciousness states do not have an internal structure that can be defined by their physical foundations. A state of consciousness does not consist of neural components. >Perception, >Consciousness. II 123 If we assume that all the brain properties are mental (what ever that might mean) this puts us in no more favorable position to explain anything about our familiar impressions and sensations. The explanatory gap is as wide as ever, except that we now call both sides "mental". >Experience, >Perception._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to Mental States
